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As Michael Lipton seems to have missed the basic
thrust of my argument, I believe it is necessary to
reiterate the underlying points on which my
observations rest.
The central theme is that knowledge is to a large
extent socially determined. No-one in these days
of Kuhn will deny this proposition in the case of
even the physical sciences, let alone the social.
Secondly, in the case of the dependent peripheral
countries, legitimated knowledge is determined
by the particular socio-economic relationships
between the centre and the dependent periphery.
This means that, with some notable exceptions
Which we will discuss later, legitimated knowledge
of a fundamental nature has continued to develop
in the centre and spread to the periphery. (I use
the word legitimated because there is a strong
undercurrent of social comment which is not
represented in the scholarly literature in Sri
Lanka). There are bureaucratic aspects to knowl-
edge both in the centre and the periphery, but
knowledge in the periphery under the dominant
socio-economic relationship has historically re-
mained more bureaucratized, more routinized
and more dependent than in the centre. Also, in
cases where the centre does not generate knowl-
edge, it acts as a clearing house, transmitter and
legitimizer of knowledge in the periphery.
This is the broad thrust of my argument and I
would hasten to add that it is not per se a "call
to a return to a cultural encapsulation", or for an
end to exchange of ideas between the developed
and developing countries, or for evolving an
individual social science for every developing
country, as Michael implies. On the contrary, I
desire a really free exchange, but because of the
structural dependent relationship there is in
actuality no free exchange of ideas: a relationship
of unequal exchange exists, paralleling that in the
economic sphere. This unequal exchange of ideas
is upheld by a set of socio-economic relationships
that can only be described as imperialistic.
Some of th&se relationships I had touched upon
in the original article but I wish to give two
further examples. One is the unfair situation
where Western researchers have formal and in-
formal access to resources and information in
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Third World countries because of the weight of
their countries of origin, which no Third World
researcher is ever reciprocally afforded in the
Western worldor for that matter in his own
country. There is also the almost ludicrous
example of visiting economists advising Third
World countries about solving problems of un-
employed graduates including unemployed econo-
mists: the graduate unemployment largely solved
thereby is that of the visiting foreign experts.
Further, what I am complaining about is not that
there has been no emergence of a Marx or a
Keynes in the Third World generally, as Lipton
believes my position to be, but that there has
been no appearance of an Andre Gunder Frank,
a Santos, a Stavenhagen or a Furtado in certain
Third World countries in South Asia. It is my
contention that it is not smallness of size of a
country (as implied by Lipton) that prevents such
emergence but the dependent structural relation-
ships with external reference groups etc. There
are in Sri Lanka a large number of unemployed
and under-employed economic graduates, yet we
have sought much foreign economic expertise. I
would guess that there are more social scientists
in Sri Lanka today than in Great Britain at the
time of Marx; and a number comparable to that
in Sweden n the 1940s when a Myrdal was
produced.
Why the Latin Americans were able to produce a
vigorous body of development knowledge (which
is now being legitimized and re-transmitted by
centres like the IDS to the rest of the Third
World) is because in the 1960s they critically
confronted the analyses and solutions propagated
by the metropolitan centre.
Gamini Corea, whom Michael cites as an example
of a successful Sri Lankan economist, has reached
eminence partly by filling positions created in-
itially by the work of these Latin Americans. I
believe Corea (or Lai Jayawardena, the other
Sri Lankan economist whom Lipton cites) would
be the last to identify himself as an original con-
tributor to serious socio-economic thought in the
manner of some Latin Americans.
Michael cites the first ten-year plan of Sri Lanka
which was fathered by Corea and legitimized by
foreign economists. It was also similarly acknowl-
edged by Lipton's former colleague, Myrdal, as a
good technical exercisebut not a fundamental
intellectual breakthrough. But the latter drew
attention to the crucial fact that the Plan had
very little effect on development in the country
because it had no organic interaction with the
social, economic and political reality. (As illus-
trative of this lack of inter-action, compare for
instance the very healthy relationship at an insti-
tute like the IDS where students and staff can
confront each other as at least nominal equals
with the situation existing in Sri Lanka where
Sri Lankan visiting economists have almost no
contact with the local university community).
Similarly, Lipton's admired Indian economists,
who (according to him) cannot carry through
their excellent suggestions because of the perfidy
of politicians, also belong to this genre of
unrealistic economic technocrats.
What has prevented South Asian social scientists
breaking new ground is perhaps their inability to
recognize the conceptual inadequacy of their
handed-down sciences to match the social reality
in their countries. They are, in Naipaul's term.
'Mimic Men'.
I believe Lipton's cry for what may be called a
free trade policy for academic exchange is un-
realistic and unfair; due to the present structural
limitations, such exchanges would inevitably be
unequal and would benefit only those at the
resource-rich end. (This tendency to wish away
reality is perhaps the neo-colonial economist's
constant blind spot). Yet a degree of social
scientific self-reliance has been successful in devel-
opment strategies, as witness the cases of the
USSR, China, North Korea or even Japan
('Wakon Yasai'). Moreover, countries in the
Middle East, by purely political decisions, have
set themselves on firm development paths. ('West-
ern development experts in cases of conflict of
interest as arise in the Middle East would have a
natural tendency not to recommend policies that
would ultimately go against their own interests).
The points I have made are being increasingly
realized by social scientists in dependent countries.
Several pronouncements on academic colonialism
have been coming through loud and clear from
all three continents (Santiagoa signatory here
was Gamini CoreaAbidjan, New Delhi etc.).
The future relationship in the development scene
is to be at least one between equals. We are enter-
ing a phase of selective discrimination against
western academics (either formally or informally).
To prevent projects like Camelot, foreign
researchers will increasingly be put under the
direct supervision of local academics. The
academic proletariat and the colonized are about
to break their chains, and if the erstwhile colon-
izers do not heed the warning signs in time, they
will soon find themselves without their jobs.
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